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 Fiscal Support and Earnings Management 
 
Abstract:  It is well documented that firms tend to manipulate earnings before IPO (initial 
public offerings) and SEO (seasoned equity offerings). This study contributes to the literature 
by providing the first evidence on whether and how fiscal support in the form of preferential 
tax treatment and financial subsidy affects a firm’s earnings management behaviors. Using 
data for Chinese firms that have conducted IPO and SEO, I find that firms have a lower level 
of earnings management prior to the offerings if they enjoy more preferential tax treatment or 
more financial subsidies from local governments. My results are consistent with the view that 
firms that receive stronger fiscal support have smaller demand for earnings management, 
which is a costly tool for a firm to achieve its desired earnings targets.  
 
JEL classification: M41; M48; G14; G15; G18; H32 
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1. Introduction 
Officially opened in the early 1990s, China’s stock exchanges were established as an 
experiment in combining a market economy with central planning. As most listed Chinese 
companies are sponsored and controlled by government-related entities, governmental 
intervention in the stock market has dominated throughout. The quotas of IPOs distributed 
across the nation are allocated by a local government to firms selected from its jurisdiction. 
The local government deems the listed firms within its jurisdiction a symbol of wealth and 
prestige as well as a potent tool to promote territorial economic growth (Chan, Lin, & Mo, 
2006). While local firms finance investments and business expansion through equity 
offerings, more foreign capital resources would be absorbed to the municipal jurisdictions for 
local businesses, thereby stimulating economic development in the territory. However, the 
regulations require firms to attain a minimum rate of return on equity (ROE) to be qualified 
for rights offerings. Furthermore, investors tend to rely on earnings more than any other 
summary measures of firm performance to make their investment decisions (Biddle, Seow, & 
Siegel, 1995; Francis, Schipper, & Vincent, 2003; Graham, Harvey, & Rajgopal, 2005; Liu, 
Nissim, & Thomas, 2002). Therefore, to facilitate financing, both the local governments and 
their listed firms aim for a high level of corporate reported earnings prior to equity offerings. 
On the one hand, local governments compete to lend fiscal support (i.e., preferential tax 
treatment and financial subsidy) to local firms in support of their financing (Chen & Lee, 
2001), thus inducing drastic competition for capital resources among the local governments.1 
On the other hand, firms that desire low financing costs tend to manipulate earnings to a high 
level.  
This paper aims to investigate whether and how fiscal support in the form of preferential 
                                                        
1 Chen and Lee (2001) provide descriptive statistics and univariate tests on the fiscal support for Chinese 
listed firms during 1997–1999. They show that in order to compete for capital resources from the capital 
market, local governments generally grant income tax preferences and financial subsidies to firms listed 
under their jurisdictions.  
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tax treatment and financial subsidy affects a firm’s earnings management behaviors in China. 
My investigation is motivated by the growing interests in the influence of political forces on 
firm activities in a transitional economy such as China (e.g., Gul, 2006; Leuz & Oberholzer, 
2007; Piotroski, Wong, & Zhang, 2015; Hung, Wong, & Zhang, 2012). Fiscal support from 
local governments is one source of political force that prevails in the transitional economy yet 
has remained unexplored by researchers. This study fills this void in the literature. Given the 
privatization through sales of government-owned enterprises and the increased opportunities 
for global investors (especially those from Europe and the United States) to purchase shares 
in China’s stock market, understanding the role of fiscal support in a firm’s financial 
reporting incentive is important to the market participants.2 This practical implication can be 
generalized to other institutional settings where there are varied fiscal policies implemented 
across jurisdictions within a country (e.g., the United States) or across different countries 
within a politico-economic union (e.g., the European Union). 
Both earnings management and fiscal support could help a firm achieve its desired 
earnings targets. However, earnings inflated by a firm would reverse and decline in the 
subsequent periods, which induces high risks of subsequent detection and hence reputational 
loss along with litigation and regulatory actions to a firm (e.g., Ball & Shivakumar, 2008; He, 
2015). Hence, earnings management is a very risky and costly tool for a firm to boost its 
reported earnings. In contrast, while substituting for earnings management in propping up 
earnings numbers, fiscal support brings about real cash benefits for a firm. Thus, given a 
firm’s desired level of reported earnings, fiscal support reduces the firm’s demand for 
earnings management. Accordingly, I hypothesize that firms that receive stronger fiscal 
                                                        
2 Many transitional economies such as China, India, and Vietnam have been privatizing their state-owned 
enterprises by either selling government-owned shares in the domestic market or listing in developed 
overseas markets. The capital-raising activities of the state-owned enterprises have triggered fierce 
competition among global stock exchanges to attract new listings from Chinese firms (Kissel & Santini, 
2004), notably for the world’s biggest IPO by the Industrial & Commercial Bank of China Ltd. (ICBC)’s 
$19-billion share issuance.   
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support from local governments have a lower level of earnings management.  
Equity offerings in China provide an ideal setting to test this hypothesis. The reasons are 
two-fold. First, the hypothesis is based on the premise that managers have a desire to achieve 
certain earnings targets. Chinese equity issuers generally target a particular high level of 
reported earnings that appeal to investors so that they can manage to raise full capital as 
planned (Aharony, Lee, & Wong, 2000). Second, local governments in China tend to fiscally 
support local firms for their financing such that more capital resources and foreign 
investments would be attracted to their jurisdictions. As a result, Chinese firms, to a varied 
extent, enjoy fiscal support from local governments during equity offerings.  
Using data for Chinese firms that conducted IPO (initial public offerings) and SEO 
(seasoned equity offerings), I find strong evidence in support of the hypothesis. In particular, 
I find that firms have a smaller magnitude of earnings management prior to equity offerings if 
they enjoy more financial subsidies or more income tax savings attributed to income tax 
preferences granted by local governments. I also find that income tax preference mitigates a 
firm’s earnings management to a larger extent than financial subsidy does. Prior research (e.g., 
Aharony et al., 2000; Chen, Firth, Gao, & Rui, 2006; Haw, Qi, Wu, & Wu, 2005; Liu & Lu, 
2007) documents that listed Chinese companies mainly use accruals to manipulate earnings. 
Hence, I use abnormal accruals as the proxy for earnings management, which is estimated 
based on the modified Jones model. The results are robust to using other discretionary accrual 
models such as the one developed by Ball and Shivakumar (2006). My main test treats fiscal 
support as exogenous to earnings management. However, if local governments tend to offer 
fiscal support to firms that have poor earnings performance, firms who wish for stronger 
fiscal support will lack incentive to manipulate earnings. This alternatively explains the 
negative association between fiscal support and earnings management. To address this 
potential self-selection and endogeneity problem, I use a two-stage least squares estimation 
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procedure. The results of the test are similar to my main findings.  
This paper contributes to the literature in several aspects. First, to my knowledge, this 
study is the first to examine the impact of fiscal support on a firm’s earnings management 
behaviors. The findings suggest that institutional factors such as fiscal support that bear the 
political incentives of local governments should be accounted for in studying earnings 
management in China’s or other East Asian emerging markets in which fiscal support from 
local government prevails and government intervention into firm’s reporting practices 
predominates (e.g., Bushman, Piotroski, & Smith, 2004; Gul, 2006; Leuz & Oberholzer, 2007; 
Piotroski et al., 2015; Hung et al., 2012).  
Second, Chen, Lee, & Li (2008) find that local governments offer financial subsidies to 
help their local firms achieve their earnings targets for rights offerings, and they compare the 
subsidy grants to a sort of “real earnings management” directed by local governments. But 
Chen et al. (2008) do not investigate how the governmental subsidy affects managerial 
incentives and firm-level activities. This is the focus of my study. I account for a broader 
range of fiscal support including income tax preference and explore whether the fiscal 
support affects the firm-level earnings management behaviors.  
To the extent that fiscal support is a sort of government-directed “real earnings 
management,” this study contributes to the recent strand of earnings management literature 
(e.g., Cohen, Dey, & Lyz, 2008; Bhojraj, Hribar, Picconi, & McInnis, 2009; Jian & Wong, 
2010; Zang, 2012; Cohen & Zarowin, 2010; Badertscher, 2011; Gunny, 2010; Burnett, Cripe, 
Martin, & McAllister, 2012; Chan, Chen, Chen & Yu, 2015), which documents a substitutive 
relationship between real and accrual-based earnings management for achieving earnings 
targets. In essence, these recent studies show that each of the real and accrual-based earnings 
management activities decreases with its own costs and increases with the costs of the other. 
Different from the firm-level real earnings management that has suboptimal business 
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outcomes or negative economic consequences for a firm, government-directed “earnings 
management,” the fiscal support I focus on in this study, has positive real cash benefits for a 
firm. Hence, given a desired level of reported earnings to achieve, fiscal support is a robust 
substitutive mechanism for firm-level earnings management.  
Third, there is growing evidence that government intervention and political forces shape 
financial reporting incentives of firms. For instance, Bushman et al. (2004) and Leuz and 
Oberholzer (2007) document that firms facing increased government intervention have an 
incentive to reduce financial reporting transparency and tilt the reported valuation to 
minimize the political costs. The political costs include an increase in tax burdens as well as a 
host of indirect taxes, such as tightened regulation or threat of greater government 
intervention into a firm’s business activities. Piotroski et al. (2015) provide evidence that 
firms are inclined to suppress negative financial information in view of the expected political 
costs from the governments. This strand of literature focuses on the expected political costs 
associated with the given financial outcome of a firm to investigate the issue of how a firm’s 
financial reporting practice is shaped by government intervention. In contrast, my study sheds 
light on this issue from a new perspective, that is, the benefits rather than the costs of political 
forces to a firm, and sees how a firm’s financial reporting incentives are affected by fiscal 
support from local governments.  
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the institutional 
background. Section 3 develops the research hypothesis. Section 4 presents the research 
design. Section 5 discusses the empirical results, and Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Institutional background 
2.1. China’s tax regimes and fiscal support from local governments  
In China, the central government implements a planned quota system for IPOs, under 
MS-14-11-605 Final Draft 
10/15/15 
 6                                                                                 
which a limited listing quota is assigned to the planning commission at the provincial level, 
and then the local governments make the allocation to IPO candidates within their 
administrative region. The limited share quota assigned to each firm is usually too small to 
meet its capital need (Chen & Yuan, 2004). To enhance the firms’ capital-raising during IPO 
as well as their subsequent rights offerings, Chinese local governments compete to lend fiscal 
support to their local IPO or SEO firms to attract investment that is essential to the territorial 
economic growth.  
Before 2002, there were three avenues for a local government to lend fiscal support to 
firms within its jurisdiction: preferential income tax rate, income tax refund, and financial 
subsidy. The first two comprised the income tax preference a firm enjoyed. Nevertheless, 
since the policy of “first tax last refund” (i.e., income tax refund) was abolished in 2002, 
there had been only two avenues available (i.e., preferential income tax rate and financial 
subsidy) for local governments to mitigate the effective tax burden of companies in their 
administrative regions. After 2007, when most preferential tax provisions were abrogated, 
local governments mainly resort to subsidy grants to support their listed companies. 
Preferential income tax rate policy usually serves as a tax incentive for firms located in 
special economic zones, fast-developing economic and technologic regions, as well as other 
designated regions, and it aims at encouraging the development of certain industries such as 
high-tech, energy, transportation, infrastructures, and agriculture industry. The firms entitled 
to the tax rate preference pay their income tax at a rate lower than the standard tax rate of 
33%, varying between 27% and 0% depending on the firm attributes. The approval of tax rate 
preferences for companies is up to the discretion of the local tax bureau or local State 
Administration of Taxation (SAT) office, which is an indispensable affiliated segment of the 
local government. Most Chinese local governments grant income tax rate preferences to 
companies that fail to meet the national criteria for granting preferential income tax rate 
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(Chen & Lee, 2001). Thus, many Chinese companies, to a varied extent, manage to enjoy the 
benefits from the preferential tax rate policy.  
Most listed companies in China were subject to the standard tax rate of 30% plus the 
local tax of 3% prior to their listing on the stock exchange. Those companies would no sooner 
be listed than receive approval from local governments to enjoy a preferential income tax rate. 
The ensuing lower tax burden results in a higher level of reported earnings for the companies, 
thereby facilitating their financing through the subsequent equity offerings. The 30% standard 
tax rate could be reduced to 27%, 15%, or even 0% as a tax preference for firms. The specific 
amount of the 3% local tax to be levied from firms was arbitrarily up to the discretion of local 
governments. The local governments were prone to waive the 3% local tax to support local 
firms in their financing and investments. As such, the effective tax rates for most listed 
Chinese companies fell in the following three intervals: 15%–18%, 24%–27%, and 
30%–33%, with some of the firms enjoying an income tax exemption. 
Before 2002, local governments could first levy income tax on companies at a rate of 
33% and then refund part of the tax to the companies. Which company would be “qualified” 
for the refund and how much of the refund would be paid were up to the discretion of local 
governments (Wu, Wang, Lin, Li, & Chen, 2007). When a local government found it hard to 
get a favorable ground to grant preferential income tax rate to a firm, they used to resort to 
this “first tax last refund” practice to relieve the tax burden on their listed companies. Local 
governments that wished to attract foreign investments in local business usually offered large 
tax refunds to local companies right before the IPO to facilitate their financing (Chen & Lee, 
2001).  
Financial subsidy is another instrument for a local government to lend support to firms 
within its jurisdiction. Subsidies from local governments can be exempt from income tax, 
subject to approval from the Chinese central government. Local Chinese bureaucrats 
MS-14-11-605 Final Draft 
10/15/15 
 8                                                                                 
generally expect firms located in their jurisdictions to produce strong performance results 
since the provincial leaders’ promotions and demotions are significantly associated with the 
economic performance of the province under their control (Li, 1998; Li & Zhou, 2005; 
Piotroski et al., 2015). Since local enterprises make up the main forces of promoting the 
territorial economy, subsidy grants to enterprises prevail in China.3 In order to attract 
economic resources and promote territorial economic growth, local governments compete to 
grant financial subsidies to their local enterprises in support of their financing. Chen et al. 
(2008) show that local Chinese governments tend to use subsidies to help firms boost their 
reported earnings to meet the regulatory return on equity (ROE) threshold for rights offerings. 
Without the subsidies, which are being recognized as revenue in the income statements, a 
number of listed Chinese firms would have failed to meet the regulatory ROE requirement for 
rights issues (Chen & Lee, 2001).  
In China, under the State Council regulations governing the tax revenue sharing regime, 
enterprise income tax levied by the local SAT offices is shared between central government 
and local governments in the ratio of 60% to 40% (Liu, 2006). As 60 percent of the income 
tax levied on companies is assigned as fiscal revenues to the central government, local 
governments would only suffer 40% loss in fiscal revenues for offering income tax 
preferences to their local firms. Likewise, local governments also only suffer partial loss of 
fiscal revenues for granting “first tax last refund” to the local firms. Compared to the tax 
preference grant, a financial subsidy grant is more costly for a local government as the full 
amount of subsidies granted to firms is borne by the local government. So the income tax 
preference grant becomes a more common avenue for a local government to fiscally support 
                                                        
3 Territorial economic development and competitiveness, to a large extent, depend on performance of 
firms within the jurisdictions. Hence, local governments compete to afford local firms subsidies to support 
their investment and operation activities. For instance, in December, 2003, the local government in 
Liaoning province, where automobile industry is the mainstay of the territorial economy, granted financial 
subsidies of 100 million RMB to a local listed firm, Songliao Automating Corporation, to support its 
automotive production. Given varied economic conditions among regions, the incentive scheme of fiscal 
subsidies for local firms differs among local governments at the provincial level. 
MS-14-11-605 Final Draft 
10/15/15 
 9                                                                                 
its local firms than the financial subsidy grant. This helps explain why in China, enterprises 
that enjoy income tax preferences from local governments are far more abundant than 
enterprises that enjoy financial subsidies (Chen & Lee, 2001).4  
 
2.2. Earnings management by Chinese companies 
Prior empirical evidence indicates that investors rely on earnings more than any other 
measures of firm performance to assess firm value (Biddle et al., 1995; Liu et al., 2002; 
Francis et al., 2003). Survey results also indicate that managers view earnings as the key 
metric for performance evaluation by investors and analysts (Graham et al., 2005). Thus, in 
order to sell the shares at a higher price and raise capital at a lower cost, U. S. firms tend to 
manipulate earnings prior to equity offerings (e.g., Teoh, Welch, & Wong, 1998a, 1998b). 
This motivation behind the earnings management in U. S. firms also applies to Chinese firms 
that plan on equity offerings (e.g., Aharony et al., 2000; Liu & Lu, 2007). However, the 
motives for earnings management of Chinese firms differ from those of U. S. firms in two 
aspects.  
First, unlike the agency conflict between shareholders and managers that explains 
earnings management in most of the U. S. companies, agency conflict between controlling 
shareholders and minority shareholders accounts for a significant portion of earnings 
management for Chinese companies (Liu & Lu, 2007). In China, controlling shareholders 
tend to plunder the wealth of minority shareholders or that of prospective outside investors 
(Claessens, Djankov, & Lang, 2000; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 2000; 
Leuz, Nanda, & Wysocki, 2003; Ding, Zhang, & Zhang, 2007) and manage earnings to 
conceal their private control benefits from the public (Haw, Hu, Hwang, & Wu, 2004; Leuz et 
al., 2003). The incentives of large shareholders to manipulate earnings for wealth 
                                                        
4 Chen and Lee (2001) show that less than 5% of Chinese firms listed during 1997–1999 have no income 
tax preference, while firms that enjoy financial subsidies from local governments account for 20.19% in 
1997, 49.41% in 1998, and 54.66% in 1999.  
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expropriation are especially conspicuous in the setting of equity offerings among Chinese 
firms (e.g., Jian & Wong, 2010; Liu & Lu, 2007). 
Second, unlike listed U. S. companies, listed Chinese companies must meet certain 
financial performance criteria to be qualified for seasoned equity offerings. From 1996 to 
1998, one of the basic requirements from China Securities Regulatory Commission (hereafter, 
CSRC) was that companies had to have a minimum of 10% ROE for the three consecutive 
years prior to rights offerings (CSRC, 1996). In 1999, the rule was modified to require an 
average ROE of at least 10% as well as a minimum of 6% in each of the three years prior to 
the offerings (CSRC, 1999). From 2001 onwards, CSRC relaxed the restriction to a minimum 
of 6% ROE for each of the three years before the offerings (CSRC, 2001). This regulatory 
requirement incentivizes Chinese firms to inflate earnings to meet the ROE benchmark prior 
to rights offerings. Consistent with this notion, Chen and Yuan (2004), Haw et al. (2005), and 
Liu and Lu (2007) all find that the listed Chinese firms tend to manipulate earnings to meet 
the ROE requirements in order to qualify for SEO.5  
 
3. Hypothesis development 
Prior research (e.g., Shivakumar, 2000) shows that financing at a low cost is one of the 
major motives for earnings manipulation. However, investors place less value on the earnings 
that are suspected of manipulation by a firm. Companies identified as earnings manipulators 
will be subject to a substantial increase in their costs of capital. Shivakumar (2000) provides 
evidence that investors rationally infer earnings management at the offerings announcements 
and correct the price accordingly. Haw et al. (2005) find that in China, investors are able to 
see through the managed earnings and to rationally adjust it in their investment decisions 
during rights offerings. DeFond and Park (2001) focus on the general setting and provide 
                                                        
5 There is no explicit minimum ROE requirement for a Chinese firm to qualify for IPO, but earnings is the 
key determinant of the offer price. Thus, Chinese firms generally have an incentive to manipulate earnings 
to inflate offer price before IPO. 
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evidence that market participants could anticipate the reversal implication of abnormal 
accruals. Thus, once a firm’s earnings management is undone by outside investors at equity 
offering announcements, the firm might either fail to raise full capital as planned or be 
subject to price discount by external investors early around the equity offering dates.  
    Even if, using earnings manipulation, a firm might manage to deceive the outside 
stakeholders at the offering announcements, the firm would still bear high risks of subsequent 
detection. Earnings management is just like borrowing future earnings for current use and 
thus would reverse and decline in the subsequent periods. Prior studies (e.g., Teoh et al., 
1998a, 1998c) provide evidence that earnings management prior to equity offerings is 
responsible for poor earnings performance after the offerings. This earnings reversal leads 
outside investors to suspect that earnings have been managed upwards before the equity 
offerings (e.g., Ball & Shivakumar, 2008). Accordingly, investors adjust for their earlier 
mispricing and further impose a price discount on firms for their earnings manipulation. 
Consistent with this notion, prior research (e.g., Rangan, 1998; Teoh et al., 1998a) documents 
that pre-offerings earnings management explains the long-term stock underperformance after 
equity offerings. The subsequent detection of earnings management results in reputational 
loss for a firm and hence increases its costs of capital and impairs its capability to raise future 
financing (He, 2015).  
    Earnings management also increases a firm’s litigation risks. Firms might suffer from 
lawsuits and regulatory actions for their earnings management and hence bear the litigation 
costs. Ducharme, Malatesta, and Sefcik (2004) find that abnormal accruals are particularly 
high for SEO firms that are subsequently sued, and the settlement amounts are positively 
associated with the level of abnormal accruals. Their evidence implies that the earnings 
management drives the post-SEO litigation. Also, Billings and Lewis-Western (2015) find 
that aggressive pre-IPO financial reporting triggers legal consequences. Similar to SEC in the 
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United States, CSRC in China regularly carries out investigation to identify and prosecute 
financial frauds among equity issuers. Any regulatory enforcement action taken against a firm 
that engages in fraudulent financial reporting would have negative economic consequences 
for the firm. Chen, Firth, Gao, and Rui (2005) provide evidence that firms that are subject to 
CSRC enforcement actions experience a drastic decline in stock price, a greater rate of 
auditor change, a much higher incidence of qualified audit opinions, increased CEO turnover, 
and wider bid-ask spreads.  
    In sum, earnings management is a risky and costly instrument for a firm to boost its 
reported earnings. In contrast, fiscal support per se not only is costless for a firm but also 
increases the firm’s real cash flows. Recent literature (e.g., Cohen & Zarowin, 2010; Zang, 
2012; Chan et al., 2015) documents that firms tend to use multiple earnings management 
tools as substitutes to achieve their desired earnings targets. These studies show that when 
discretion is more (less) costly for one earnings management tool, firms will make more (less) 
use of others. In a similar vein, while substituting for earnings management to boost the 
reported earnings, fiscal support adds real cash benefits to a firm. As such, given a firm’s 
desired level of reported earnings, fiscal support should reduce the firm’s demand for 
earnings management. This argument is in line with the incentive theory (e.g., Kerr, 1995), 
which contends that one would be less likely to commit malpractice to reap its private 
benefits if it is given an economic incentive. Fiscal support is one such incentive that reduces 
the likelihood that firms venture upon earnings manipulation to achieve their earnings targets. 
The discussion above leads to the hypothesis formulated in an alternative form as follows. 
H1: Ceteris paribus, firms that obtain stronger fiscal support from local governments have 
a smaller magnitude of earnings management. 
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4. Research design 
4.1. Sample selection 
The data are obtained from both the China Stock Market and Accounting Research 
(CSMAR) database and the Wind database. Panel A of Table 1 describes the sample selection 
procedure. Sample selection starts with the entire population of both IPO firms and SEO 
firms on the Shenzhen and Shanghai stock exchanges over 1997–2006. The new Chinese 
Enterprise Income Tax Law promulgated in March 2007 abrogated the original tax regime 
that allowed varied income tax rates applicable for different types of firms, and it stipulated a 
25% enterprise income tax rate applied to almost all firms in China from 1 January 2008 
onwards. As such, in 2007, when the new income tax law was promulgated, firms that had an 
income tax rate above 25% under the old tax regime would have an incentive to manage 
earnings downwards in 2007. In this way, the firms could reduce income tax expenditure by 
reserving more earnings to be recognized after 2008 when they would enjoy the lower level 
of income tax rate (i.e., 25%) under the new tax regime. In a similar vein, firms that were 
subject to an income tax rate below 25% under the old tax regime had an incentive to manage 
earning upwards to take advantage of the lower tax rate that was still available in 2007. Since 
the earnings management in 2007 enables firms to minimize tax costs, I expect it to prevail 
among Chinese firms in 2007. This would cause confounding effects to my results if firms in 
2007 are included in my sample. Hence, the sample period ends in 2006. 
Following the sample selection method proposed by Rangan (1998), if listed companies 
have equity offerings more than once within any three years during the sample period, I 
choose only the earliest equity offering to trim measurement errors arising from the iterative 
offerings. Financial institutions are removed because the financial variables for financial 
institutions are not comparable to those for non-financial firms. I further eliminate firms 
whose listings had been postponed and firms that lack industry information from the 
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databases. The final sample consists of 3,290 firm-year observations for the selected firms 
that have complete financial information during the three years prior to the year of equity 
offerings.6 Panel B of Table 1 summarizes the distribution of the final sample across fiscal 
years and industries.7  
 
4.2. Variable measures 
4.2.1. Earnings management  
 While I use different models of abnormal accruals in my sensitivity tests, the main tests 
are based on the following cross-sectional version of the industry-specific modified Jones 
model (e.g., Dechow, Sloan, & Sweeney, 1995; Hunt, Moyer, & Shevlin, 1996; Peasnell, 
Pope, & Young, 2000): 
, , 1 0 1 , 1 2 , , , 1 3 , , 1 ,/ (1/ ) ( ) / ( / )i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i tTA A A REV REC A PPE A                      (1) 
where TAi,t is total accruals for firm i in fiscal year t;
8 REVi,t is change in revenues for firm i 
in fiscal year t; Ai,t-1 is total assets for firm i at the end of fiscal year t-1; RECi,t is change in 
accounts receivable for firm i at the end of fiscal year t. The model assumes that no 
systematic earnings management occurs for the cross-sectional estimation sample. So I 
exclude the IPO and SEO firm-year observations when using model (1) to do the cross- 
sectional parameter estimates. The parameter estimation incorporates a constant term, 0, 
since doing so mitigates the model misspecification problem (Kothari, Leone, & Wasley, 
2005). Abnormal accruals (DA) for firm i in fiscal year t are measured by the residual value 
                                                        
6 I focus on the three-year pre-offerings period for my sampling because firms that conduct equity 
offerings are required to publicly disclose their financial performance for the most recent three years prior 
to the offerings.  
7 I use the industry classification provided by CSRC, which classifies firms into 13 major industries such 
as manufacturing, real estate, commercial, etc. 
8 For post-1998 data, TA is computed as the difference between operating net income and operating cash 
flows. For other years when cash flow statement data are not available, I compute TA as: (change in current 
assets – change in cash – change in short-term lending) – (change in current liabilities – change in short- 
term borrowings – change in accrued income taxes – change in current portion of long-term debts) – 
depreciation expense – amortization expense, where the change is computed between year t and t-1. 
MS-14-11-605 Final Draft 
10/15/15 
 15                                                                                 
from the model.  
There has been growing evidence (e.g., Roychowdhury, 2006; Zang, 2012; Chan et al., 
2015) of how firms manage earnings through real activities manipulation in addition to the 
accruals-based method. For instance, Cohen and Zarowin (2010) provide evidence that SEO 
firms in the United States engage in real earnings management in addition to accruals-based 
earnings management prior to the offerings. Following Roychodhury (2006) and Cohen and 
Zarowin (2010), I calculate real earnings management for my sample firms through three 
metrics: abnormal cash flows from operations, abnormal discretionary expenses, and 
abnormal production costs. In results not reported, however, I do not find significant positive 
abnormal production costs, negative abnormal discretionary expenses, nor negative abnormal 
cash flows from operations prior to equity offerings. This suggests that equity issuers in 
China do not engage in real earnings management that is more costly for a firm than 
accruals-based earnings management. Though real earnings management is less likely to be 
scrutinized and detected by outsiders (e.g., Cohen et al., 2008; Cohen & Zarowin, 2010), the 
Chinese issuers still rely primarily on the accruals-based method, probably in the belief that 
they could still fool some less-sophisticated investors who are not capable of undoing the 
accruals manipulation. A statistically significant variance of real earnings management 
(relative to 0) for the sample is requisite for the empirical analysis of the substitutive 
relationship between real earnings management and fiscal support. Hence, I do not account 
for real earnings management in this study. 
 
4.2.2. Fiscal support variables 
Fiscal support from local governments includes preferential income tax rate, income tax 
refund, and financial subsidy. Companies with a preferential income tax rate have reduced 
income tax expense. So I estimate a firm’s income tax savings attributed to preferential 
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income tax rate as the difference between the standard income tax expense (i.e., 33% of 
pre-tax income) and the actual income tax expense. The total amount of income tax savings 
equals the income tax refund plus the income tax savings ascribed to preferential income tax 
rate. Income tax savings rate (TAXSAV) is then calculated as the total amount of the income 
tax savings deflated by net income, which reflects the extent to which income tax preference 
contributes to boosting a firm’s reported earnings.9 Financial subsidy is derived from the 
account of “subsidy income” in a firm’s income statement. The subsidy rate (SI), calculated 
as subsidy income divided by net income, is used to measure the extent to which a firm 
benefits from financial subsidies in achieving its earnings performance.  
 
4.3. Multivariate regression analysis 
The following pooled OLS regression model is conducted to test H1. 
 0 1 1 2 3 4 5
6 ( ) ( )
DA TFI MKT LEV SIZE EXP ROA
ROA year fixed effects region fixed effects
      
 
      
    
                 (2) 
The dependent variable, DA, is the abnormal accruals estimated using the industry- 
specific modified Jones model with IPO and SEO observations deleted in the cross-sectional 
estimation of normal accruals.10 TFI is defined as the sum of subsidy rate (SI) and tax 
savings rate (TAXSAV), where SI equals subsidy income divided by net income for a firm 
over a fiscal year and TAXSAV equals 33% of pre-tax income minus income tax expense and 
plus tax refund, deflated by net income for a firm over a fiscal year.11 
                                                        
9 Observations are eliminated if net income is equal to zero or negative. 
10 The deleted IPO and SEO observations include those that have IPOs or SEOs either at the current fiscal 
year or in the future two fiscal years.  
11 In China, either a non-tax-deductible expense item or a tax-exempt income item generates book-tax 
difference for a firm. So, a firm needs to adjust its pre-tax income upwards by the non-tax-deductible 
expense and downwards by the tax-exempt income to obtain its taxable income number. However, on the 
one hand, expenses not necessarily incurred to generate revenue are treated by China’s enterprise income 
tax law as a non-tax-deductible expense. In this sense, the non-tax-deductible expense should not 
constitute a source of income tax savings attributed to income tax preference. On the other hand, the tax 
exemptions for some income items, such as interest income from state-issued bonds, constitute a source of 
income tax savings attributed to income tax preference for a firm. Therefore, I use 33% of pre-tax income 
MS-14-11-605 Final Draft 
10/15/15 
 17                                                                                 
I control for several firm characteristics that prior studies find to be related to the 
magnitude of earnings management. These firm characteristics include financial leverage 
(LEV) (e.g., DeFond & Jiambalvo, 1994; Klein, 2002), firm size (SIZE) (e.g., Haw et al., 
2004), market-to-book ratio (MKT) (e.g., Young, 1999; McNichols, 2000; Kothari et al., 
2005), and capital intensity (EXP) (e.g., Burgstahler & Dichev, 1997; Young, 1999; Klein, 
2002), which are defined in the Appendix. I also control for year and region fixed effects, 
since the incentive schemes of fiscal support vary among local governments at the provincial 
level and differ across fiscal years (Chen & Lee, 2001). I do not account for corporate 
governance characteristics in the regression because corporate governance data for most of 
the Chinese IPO and SEO firms prior to their offerings are not available.12 Last, I cluster the 
standard errors by industry to correct for the industry effects (e.g., Williams, 2000; Petersen, 
2009).13 
    The estimated abnormal accruals for IPO and SEO firms contain abnormal accruals 
purely correlated with performance in addition to the accruals related to equity offerings. To 
alleviate the concern that the modified Jones model provides biased estimates of abnormal 
accruals when firms experience extreme earnings performance (Dechow et al., 1995), I 
further include two earnings performance-related variables, operating return on assets (ROA) 
and absolute value of change in operating return on assets (∆ROA), in the regression. These 
two control variables purge the earnings management measure of a firm’s inherent accruals, 
reversal of lagged-year accruals, and growth in earnings, thus reducing measurement errors 
                                                                                                                                                                            
rather than 33% of taxable income as the benchmark to estimate TAXSAV.  
12 Around 80% of the IPO and SEO firm-years in my sample do not have corporate governance 
information. Thus, controlling for corporate governance would have substantially reduced the power of the 
tests.  
13 When robust standard errors clustered by industry are applied to correct for the industry effects, the firm 
effects are also addressed given that a firm’s industry affiliation does not vary across periods. I do not 
include industry dummies in the regression to correct for the industry effects because, in the case of 
industry effect not fixed, the dummies would not fully capture the within-industry dependence, and hence 
the standard errors are still biased downwards (Petersen, 2009). Still, I obtain almost identical results if I 
include industry dummies in the regression and then cluster the standard errors by firm.  
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(e.g., Kasznik, 1999; Frankel, Jonson, & Nelson, 2002; Klein, 2002; McNichols, 2000; Haw 
et al., 2004).  
Kothari et al. (2005) argue that a performance-matched accruals measure mitigates type 
I errors. Nevertheless, I do not use this approach in this study for three reasons. First, due to 
the limited sample size, a great value discrepancy exists between ROA of the treatment 
firm-years and ROA of the matched firm-years. Thus, just as with Haw et al. (2005), I am 
unable to form a meaningful performance-matched sample within industry-years for the 
Chinese equity offerings firms. Second, the superiority of the performance-matching 
approach in addressing biased estimates of abnormal accruals of a firm with extreme earnings 
performance lies in the assumption that, on average, treatment sample and matched firms 
have the same estimated non-event abnormal accruals and that, at the portfolio level, the 
impact of performance on accruals should be identical for the treatment and matched sample 
(Kothari et al., 2005). Nonetheless, the homogeneity in the relation between accruals and 
performance for treatment firms and matched firms is not always warranted. Third, a recent 
study by Keung and Shih (2014) finds that the performance-matching approach 
systematically underestimates the abnormal accruals and that using the performance-matched 
abnormal accruals for regression analyses will bias the regression coefficients towards zero.  
 
5. Empirical results 
5.1. Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics of the main variables used for the hypothesis tests. 
The average abnormal accruals are significantly above zero; so are all the quartiles, including 
the median of abnormal accruals. This implies that equity issuers tend to manage reported 
earnings by altering discretionary accruals prior to the offerings, which is consistent with 
prior research. The mean subsidy rate is 4.6% with a standard deviation of 19.8%, indicating 
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that an average of 4.6% of net income stems from financial subsidies from local governments. 
The mean income tax savings rate reaches 17.1%. This suggests that income tax preference is 
generally more significant in upgrading a firm’s earnings performance than financial subsidy. 
The mean TFI amounts to 21.7%, suggesting that an average of 21.7% of net income of the 
sample firms is ascribed to fiscal support from local governments. In addition, it can be 
inferred from the quartiles that the income tax preference grant is more prevalent than the 
financial subsidy grant for equity issuers in China. Table 3 reports Pearson (Spearman) 
correlations among the variables used in regression model (2). The correlation coefficients 
are all below 0.50, suggesting that no significant multicollinearity problem exists for model 
(2).  
 
5.2. Regression results 
5.2.1. Test of H1: The effect of fiscal support on earnings management 
Table 4 presents the results for the test of H1. The coefficient on TFI is negative and 
highly significant at the 1% level, which supports H1 that fiscal support reduces earnings 
management. Consistent with prior studies, the coefficients on the control variables, LEV, 
MKT, SIZE, EXP, ROA, and ∆ROA, are all statistically significant in the expected sign. This 
indicates that firms with higher financial leverage, higher market-to-book ratio, smaller size, 
less capital expenditure, or stronger earnings performance have higher abnormal accruals. 
The results are robust to winsorizing the observations with extreme variable values (1% at 
both tails) and to excluding the outliers from the sample using Cook’s (1977) distance 
statistics. 
 
5.2.2. The differential effects of income tax preference and financial subsidy on earnings 
management 
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Fiscal support can be classified into the categories of preferential tax treatment and 
financial subsidy on account of their distinct attributes. The distinction is three-fold. First, as 
noted in Section 2.1, an income tax preference grant is less costly for local governments than 
a financial subsidy grant. Second, income tax preference barely changes across fiscal periods 
once granted to a firm by a local government, whereas the scheme of a financial subsidy 
grant can vary to a large extent across fiscal years. In this sense, preferential tax treatment 
serves more of a relatively stable and long-term economic incentive to a firm compared to a 
subsidy grant that varies across fiscal years. Third, unlike preferential tax treatment, financial 
subsidy grant is virtually unregulated by any law or regulation in China. When and how much 
financial subsidies would be granted to firms are arbitrarily at the discretion of local 
governments. Thus, compared to preferential tax treatment, the subsidy grant is a more 
flexible instrument for local governments to help boost reported earnings of the IPO and SEO 
firms across fiscal periods. To test the differential effects of income tax preference and 
financial subsidy on earnings management, I employ a pooled OLS regression for model (2), 
where TFI is replaced with SI and TAXSAV. 
Table 5 presents the regression results. The coefficients on financial subsidy rate (SI) 
and on tax savings rate (TAXSAV) are both negative and significant at the 1% level. This 
indicates that firms are less likely to engage in earnings management if they enjoy more 
income tax savings attributed to preferential income tax treatments or enjoy more financial 
subsidies from local governments. The absolute value of the beta coefficient for tax savings 
rate (TAXSAV) is significantly larger than that for subsidy rate (SI) (F-stat. = 3.53), indicating 
that the attenuating impact of income tax preference on earnings management is stronger than 
that of financial subsidy. This is probably because preferential tax treatment is more of a 
stable and long-run economic incentive to a firm compared to a subsidy grant that varies 
across fiscal years, thus making the firm less motivated to manage earnings to window-dress 
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its performance. 
Corporate income tax preference takes the form of tax refunds and preferential income 
tax rate. To further probe the effect of preferential income tax rate on earnings management, I 
deduct the tax refund from the total tax savings to construct the preferential income tax rate 
variable, with which I replace TAXSAV to re-run the regression.14 The results (not tabulated) 
suggest that preferential income tax rate alone significantly reduces earnings manipulation 
activities of a firm prior to its equity offerings.  
 
5.2.3. Separate IPO firms from SEO firms for test of H1 
Since the motivation for earnings management of IPO firms likely differs from that of 
SEO firms (Teoh et al., 1998a; Haw et al., 2005), I partition my sample into IPO firm-years 
and SEO firm-years for the hypothesis test. When testing H1 using the SEO sub-sample, I 
include the absolute difference between pre-subsidy ROE and regulatory ROE threshold 
(DistanceROE) to control for a firm’s potential incentives for meeting the ROE threshold for 
rights offerings. Table 6 reports the regression results based on the partitioned samples. The 
coefficients on TFI, TAXSAV, and SI for both the IPO and SEO subsamples are all negative 
and statistically significant, which supports H1.  
 
5.3. Robustness check 
5.3.1. Alternative measure of income tax savings attributed to preferential tax treatment 
To highlight the income tax savings reflected on current tax liabilities, I exclude deferred 
tax from income tax expense and employ an alternative measure of income tax savings as 
follows: 33%* [net income + (income tax expense – deferred income tax)] – (income tax 
expense – deferred income tax) + tax refund, namely, TAXSAV. I repeat my regression 
                                                        
14 Firms that have tax refunds only account for a very small percentage in my sample (46 out of 3290 
firm-years). So it is hard to test the effect of tax refund on earnings management in this study.  
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analysis using TAXSAV. The results (available upon request) are similar in all respects to 
those reported in Table 5.  
 
5.3.2. Alternative measures of earnings management 
Ball and Shivakumar (2006) argue that the conventional linear accruals models (e.g., the 
modified Jones model), which ignore the roles of accruals in timely loss recognition, 
misspecify the accounting accruals process and misestimate the abnormal and normal 
components of accruals. They find that piecewise linear regression that incorporates the 
asymmetric gain and loss recognition role of accruals substantially increases the explanatory 
power of the accruals model. Following the abnormal accruals model developed by Ball and 
Shivakumar (2006), I use both book-based and market return-based proxies for gain and loss 
to construct the piecewise-linear regression estimates for an alternative measure of abnormal 
accruals. I re-run model (2) using this alternative specification of abnormal accruals. The 
results (available upon request) are similar to those reported in Table 4 and 5. Adjusted R2 
increases to around 42%, confirming that the Ball and Shivakumar (2006) accruals model is 
superior over the traditional modified Jones model in capturing earnings management.  
 
5.3.3. Correct for endogeneity using 2SLS model 
Thus far, I assume that fiscal support is exogenous to firm-level decisions and activities. 
However, in the context of equity offerings during which local governments desire as much 
capital inflows to their jurisdictions as possible, their decisions on whether and how to 
subsidize SEO firms or IPO firms might vary across years depending on a firm’s financial 
performance. If local governments tend to lend fiscal support to firms that have poor earnings 
performance, firms that wish to obtain fiscal support from local governments would lack 
incentives to manipulate earnings. Thus, reverse causality and self-selection issues arise in 
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the way that a lesser extent of earnings management results in stronger fiscal support from 
local governments. Or rather, in the case that less earnings management is motivated by a 
firm’s desire to obtain stronger fiscal support from local governments, we could also find a 
negative association between earnings management and fiscal support.  
However, this endogeneity concern is likely minimal because my multivariate tests are 
based on a contemporaneous relation between fiscal support and earnings management. Note 
that fiscal support granted on any date during a fiscal year would be reported in a firm’s 
financial statements for this fiscal year, which is captured by my fiscal support measure at the 
end of this fiscal year. After the fiscal year-end but before the earnings announcement date, 
managers can still artificially adjust accruals by changing the accounting estimates or 
methods, which can still be captured by the DA measure for this fiscal year-end (Zang, 2012). 
In this regard, firms can engage in earnings management (to adjust their current year’s ROA) 
in response to the fiscal support they receive from local governments during the year. 
However, by the time local governments provide their firms with fiscal support, the local 
governments cannot anticipate the coming earnings management activities and final reported 
earnings of the firms. In this connection, the fiscal support event is exogenous to earnings 
management of a firm. 
Still, it is possible that both fiscal support (TFI) and earnings management (DA) are 
endogenously determined by some unobservable firm characteristics, which biases the 
coefficient estimates in model (2). To address this potential endogeneity problem, I employ a 
two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimation procedure. Two instruments are used. The first is 
GDP of a region (divided by national GDP) for a fiscal year, which is an inverse measure of 
the budget tightness of a local government. A wealthier local government characterized by 
higher territorial GDP is less likely to face budget constraints and hence likely more generous 
in affording fiscal support to local firms. On the contrary, firms would be less likely to 
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receive fiscal support if their local governments face budget constraints in that fiscal year. 
However, the budget tightness of local governments is unlikely to directly affect a firm’s 
earnings management, making it a valid instrument for the 2SLS estimates. The second 
instrument is the industry median of pre-subsidy ROA in a firm’s region for a fiscal year 
(INDSUBSI). It satisfies the conditions for a valid instrument for two reasons. First, if 
industrial financial performance in a region is already strong for a fiscal year, firms within the 
industry would be less likely to further receive fiscal support from their local governments. 
Second, it is less likely that a firm whose financial performance falls short of its industry 
level would inflate earnings to chase the industry benchmark because earnings inflated by the 
firm would reverse and fall back to its original level in the subsequent periods. Hence, 
INDSUBSI affects fiscal support decisions but has little direct impact on the firm-level 
earnings management activities.  
Table 7 presents the results for the two-stage least squares regressions, where the 
endogenous variables, TFI, SI, and TAXSAV, are instrumented respectively. The Basmann 
statistics of the over-identifying restriction test for TFI (2 = 1.0125, p = 0.314), SI (2 = 
0.9272, p = 0.336), and TAXSAV (2 = 1.1756, p = 0.278) models are all statistically 
insignificant, which implies that the instruments (i.e., GDP and INDSUBSI) I construct are 
exogenous and uncorrelated with the error terms. The partial F-statistics are all well above the 
cutoff point of 11.59 and statistically significant at the 1% level—further support that the 
models are not subject to weak instrument problems (Stock, Wright, & Yogo, 2002; Larcker 
& Rusticus, 2010).15 In the first-stage estimation, INDSUBSI takes on a negative and 
significant coefficient, consistent with the notion that firms whose industrial financial 
performance in the region is strong would less likely be fiscally supported by their local 
                                                        
15 According to Stock et al. (2002), when there are two instrumental variables in the first-stage regression, 
the F-statistic for the instruments needs to be above 11.59 to reject the null hypothesis that the instruments 
are weak.  
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governments. A significantly positive coefficient on ROA implies that local governments tend 
to fiscally support firms that have a good earnings performance. As there is no evidence that 
local governments tend to lend fiscal support to poorly performing firms, I refute the 
self-selection possibility that lack of earnings management activities is driven by firms’ desire 
for stronger fiscal support from local governments. The second-stage regression results show 
a significantly negative coefficient for the fitted TFI, SI, and TAXSAV, respectively. This 
further corroborates the conclusion that the regression results shown in Table 4 and 5 are free 
from the potential endogeneity bias.  
In addition, it could be argued that firms’ close relationship with the government induces 
a mechanical, negative association between fiscal support and earnings management. On the 
one hand, an IPO/SEO firm that has a closer relationship with its government is more likely 
to be fiscally supported. On the other hand, a better firm-government relationship might make 
a firm more likely to be successful in IPO or SEO, and consequently, the firm is less likely to 
manipulate earnings. In an effort to rule out this alternative explanation, I do the following 
analyses. First, I control for firm-government relationship in the first and second stage of the 
2SLS model, and the results still persist. An indicator variable for whether a firm is a state- 
owned enterprise is used as the proxy for firm-government relationship, since state-owned 
enterprises tend to have a closer relationship with the government than do non-state-owned 
enterprises (e.g., Wu, 2009; Wang, Wong, & Xia, 2008). Second, I conduct a falsification test. 
Specifically, I run a moderated regression analysis by interacting the government relationship 
measure with the fiscal support variable for model (2). If the alternative explanation holds, 
the negative impact of fiscal support on earnings management would be more pronounced for 
firms that have a stronger relationship with the government. Nonetheless, I fail to find such 
evidence, as indicated by a statistically insignificant coefficient on the interaction term. These 
results are not surprising because the alternative explanation is premised on the assumption 
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that good firm-government connection is negatively associated with earnings management. 
Some prior studies (e.g., Aharony et al., 2000; Liu & Lu, 2007; Jian & Wong, 2010), however, 
allude to the opposite, showing that government-controlled firms tend to engage in earnings 
management and tunneling activities.   
 
5.3.4. Firm-fixed effect regression of fiscal support on earnings management 
Though the pooled OLS estimation of equation (2) yields results consistent with H1, it 
cannot identify whether the impact of fiscal support comes from explaining variation in 
earnings management across firms (i.e., cross-sectional variation) or variation in earnings 
management within firms (i.e., time-series variation). The distinction between variation 
across firms and variation within firms is important because theoretical and conceptual 
arguments as regards how fiscal support is related to earnings management predict that (1) 
firms with high fiscal support are less likely to manage earnings than firms with low fiscal 
support, which is a cross-sectional prediction, (2) a firm that enjoys an increase in fiscal 
support is less likely to manipulate earnings, which is a time-series prediction. The firm-fixed 
effect model serves to distinguish these two types of variations (Wooldridge, 2000).  
To determine whether within-firm variation in fiscal support explains within-firm 
variation in earnings management, I estimate a firm-fixed effect model for equation (2).16 
This research design removes most of the cross-sectional variation in fiscal support and relies 
primarily on the within-firm (i.e., time-series) variation in fiscal support. If the negative 
association between fiscal support and earnings management is driven mainly by cross- 
sectional differences, then using the firm-fixed effect model, we expect to find no evidence of 
a relationship between fiscal support and earnings management. On the contrary, if within- 
firm variation in fiscal support explains within-firm variation in earnings management, we 
                                                        
16 The chi2 statistic for the Hausman test (not tabulated) is positive and statistically significant, suggesting 
that the firm-fixed effect model is preferred over the random effect model in controlling for firm-specific 
effects. 
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expect to find an association between fiscal support and earnings management when 
including firm-fixed effects in the regression.  
Table 8 presents the results for the firm-fixed effect regression of fiscal support on 
earnings management. The relationship between financial subsidy and earnings management 
is insensitive to including firm-fixed effects. In particular, the coefficient for subsidy rate (SI) 
is negative and significant at the 1% level. This suggests that variation in financial subsidy 
explains not only the variation in earnings management across firms, but also the time-series 
variation in earnings management within a firm. However, the coefficient for tax savings rate 
(TAXSAV) is statistically insignificant. This suggests that the significant result for TAXSAV in 
Table 5 is primarily driven by the cross-sectional variation in preferential tax treatment, not 
by the time-series variation. This is not surprising because unlike the scheme of financial 
subsidy grant, which may vary substantially across fiscal years, income tax preference barely 
changes over time once granted to a firm by a local government. The lack of time-series 
variation in preferential tax treatment induces the statistically insignificant coefficient for 
TAXSAV estimated by the firm-fixed effects model.17 
 
6. Conclusion 
This study is the first to investigate whether fiscal support has an impact on earnings 
management of a firm. Fiscal support could substitute for a firm’s earnings management in 
achieving desired earnings targets. Earnings management is costly and has negative economic 
consequences for a firm, whereas fiscal support adds up real cash benefits to a firm. Thus, 
given a firm’s desired level of reported earnings, fiscal support reduces the firm’s demand for 
                                                        
17 According to Wooldridge (2000), an effective firm-fixed effect model requires that the independent 
variable display sufficient variation over time within a firm. From a technical point of view, this is because 
the time-invariant variable would be perfectly collinear with firm-fixed effect components. From an 
economic point of view, this is because the firm-fixed effect model is designed to study what causes the 
dependent variable to change within a given firm. A time-invariant independent variable cannot cause such 
a change.  
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earnings management. Accordingly, I hypothesize that the magnitude of earnings 
management is smaller for firms that enjoy stronger fiscal support from local governments.  
The hypothesis is predicated on the premise that firms have an incentive to achieve 
certain earnings targets. Equity offerings in China induce such incentives not only for 
managers but also for a local government that aims to help its listed firms finance their 
investments. Thus, I focus on the equity offerings setting to test the hypothesis. The empirical 
results, based on the sample for both IPO firms and SEO firms from 1997 to 2006, are all 
statistically significant in support of the hypothesis. In particular, I find a lower level of 
earnings management activities for firms that enjoy more financial subsidies or more income 
tax savings attributed to preferential tax treatments from local governments. The results are 
robust to using alternative measures of income tax savings and of abnormal accruals. Also, 
the results are immune from bias caused by potential endogeneity between fiscal support and 
earnings management, as evidenced in the 2SLS analyses. I continue to find a negative 
association between financial subsidy and earnings management when I include firm-fixed 
effects in the regression. This suggests that variation in financial subsidies explains not only 
the variation in earnings management across firms, but also the time-series variation in 
earnings management within a firm. 
The findings in this study imply that institutional factors in regard to fiscal support from 
local governments should be accounted for in earnings management research on China’s 
capital market, in which fiscal support prevails and governmental influence on firms’ 
financial reporting incentives dominates. As fiscal support is compared to a sort of 
government-assisted earnings management (Chen et al., 2008), this study complements the 
recent stream of earnings management literature (e.g., Cohen & Zarowin, 2010; Badertscher, 
2011; Zang, 2012; Chan et al., 2015), which shows that firms tend to use real and 
accrual-based earnings management as substitutes to achieve their desired earnings targets.  
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In addition, I find that preferential tax treatment mitigates earnings management to a 
larger extent than financial subsidy does. However, the Chinese Enterprise Income Tax Law 
promulgated in March 2007 abrogated the original tax regime that allowed varied tax rates 
for different types of firms and legally stipulated a 25% enterprise income tax rate for almost 
all firms in China. With the repeal of income tax preference, local governments lost a 
powerful tool of lending fiscal support to their local listed firms. In China, offering financial 
subsidies to listed firms is more costly for local governments than granting income tax 
preferences. Funds available for local governments to grant financial subsidies to local firms 
are usually limited. So the increase in subsidy disbursements to compensate listed firms for 
the abrogated income tax preference would have been circumscribed. In this scenario, given a 
desired earnings target, firms might reinforce their earnings management activities. Future 
research may empirically examine whether earnings management of listed Chinese firms 
would be aggravated after the enforcement of the new Enterprise Income Tax Law. The main 
challenge of the research is the controls for other concurrent regulatory or macroeconomic 
events around 2007 (e.g., financial crisis), which would cause severe confounding effects to 
the empirical tests. A potential solution to the problem could be to employ a 
difference-in-difference research methodology and identify a set of control firms that are not 
subject to the regulatory effect of the new income tax law. Nevertheless, we are unable to find 
such control firm sample, since the new tax law is applied to almost all public and private 
firms in China.  
Lastly, some caveats need to be noted for this paper. First, as with prior research (e.g., 
Wu & Zhang, 2009; Beatty, Liao, & Yu, 2013), this study is subject to endogeneity attributed 
to potentially omitted variables. Despite efforts in addressing the endogeneity, I cannot 
completely eliminate it. Second, like some prior studies (e.g., Aharony et al., 2000; Liu & Lu, 
2007; Jian & Wong, 2010), I focus on Chinese firms that have successfully conducted IPO 
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and SEO. It would be interesting to account for firms that failed in conducting their IPO or 
SEO. Due to the data limits, I leave this issue as an avenue for future research. 
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Table 1  
Sample selection and distribution 
 
Panel A: Sample selection procedure         n 
Total number of firms that conducted equity offerings from 1997 to 2006 1838 
 Less: firms that have iterative rights offerings within three years during the sample period 385 
 Less: financial institutions with equity offerings 18 
 Less: firms whose listing had been postponed  24 
 Less: firms that lack the industry information in the databases 10 
Selected equity issuers 1401 
Sample firm-year observations during the most recent three years prior to equity offerings by the selected equity offerings firms 4203 
Exclude firm-year observations without complete financial accounting information 913 
Final sample firm-year observations  3290 
 
Panel B: Distribution of sample firm-year observations across years and industries  
Industry   1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 1994–2005  
Agriculture,  
forestry and 
fishing 
2 9 13 7 14 12 4 7 9 8 4 3 92 (2.79%) 
Mining 0 2 5 5 6 4 2 4 6 4 4 4 46 (1.40%) 
Manufacture 65 233 313 232 216 195 149 139 141 121 79 67 1950(59%) 
Utilities 8 20 27 16 18 16 11 10 12 14 7 5 164 (4.98%) 
Construction 1 5 9 6 5 3 3 7 9 5 5 4 62 (1.88%) 
Transportation 5 17 22 13 20 17 13 13 10 8 6 7 151 (4.62%) 
Information  
technology 
6 25 32 18 19 20 15 21 16 9 9 9 199 (6.04%) 
Wholesale and  
retail 
16 45 50 32 21 17 10 10 9 8 4 4 226 (6.87%) 
Real estate  11 21 25 15 15 15 10 5 3 8 8 8 144 (4.37%) 
Social service 6 13 16 12 14 12 3 3 2 4 4 4 93 (2.83%) 
Communication 
and literature 
0 2 3 2 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 (0.30%) 
Conglomerate 10 29 33 23 14 11 10 7 4 4 4 4 153 (4.65%) 
Total 130 421 548 381 363 324 230 226 221 193 134 119 3290 (100%) 
% of population 3.95 12.79 16.68 11.6 11.03 9.84 6.99 6.87 6.71 5.86 4.07 3.61 100 
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Table 2  
Descriptive Statistics 
   
    
Notes: This table presents the descriptive statistics of the main variables used in the regression analyses. The sample 
contains 3,290 firm-year observations. DA is the abnormal accruals estimated using the industry-specific modified Jones 
model with IPOs and SEOs deleted in the cross-sectional estimation of normal accruals. SI refers to the subsidy rate. 
TAXSAV refers to the income tax savings rate ascribed to both preferential income tax rate and income tax refund for a firm. 
TFI is the sum of subsidy rate (SI) and income tax savings rate (TAXSAV). All the variables, including DA, SI, TAXSAV, and 
TFI are defined in the Appendix. 
Variable  Mean  25%  Median  75%  Std. Dev 
DA  0.011  0.029  0.008  0.015  0.012 
TFI  0.217  0.142  0.214  0.294  0.233 
SI  0.046  0  0  0.018  0.198 
TAXSAV  0.171  0.087  0.211  0.249  0.127 
MKT  2.220  0  1.473  3.122  3.371 
LEV  0.516  0.412  0.533  0.642  0.155 
SIZE  8.789  8.467  8.716  9.042  0.465 
EXP  0.105  0  0  0.165  0.189 
ROA  0.112  0.065  0.095  0.138  0.079 
∆ROA  0.037  0.009  0.022  0.045  0.035 
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Table 3 
Pearson (Spearman) correlations on the upper (lower) triangle 
 
  DA  TFI   MKT  LEV  SIZE  EXP  ROA  ∆ROA 
DA  1  -0.028   0.036**  0.013  -0.138***  -0.074***  0.160***  0.158*** 
TFI  0.009  1   0.063***  -0.082***  -0.048***  -0.095***   0.120***  0.082*** 
MKT  -0.030*  0.066***   1  -0.189***  0.074***  -0.037**  -0.069***  0.021 
LEV  0.003  -0.126***   -0.347***  1  0.116***  0.070***  -0.294***  -0.115*** 
SIZE  -0.141***  -0.042**   0.238***  0.125***  1  0.230***  -0.354***  -0.130*** 
EXP  -0.038**  -0.118***   0.084***  0.076***  0.157***  1  -0.164***  -0.082*** 
ROA  0.162***  0.235***   -0.192***  -0.324***  -0.443***  -0.186***  1  0.339*** 
∆ROA  0.136***  0.124***   -0.037**  -0.100***  -0.144***  -0.101***  0.286***  1 
 
Notes: This table reports the results for the Pearson (Spearman) correlation tests. All the variables are defined in the Appendix. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance 
at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 4  
Test of H1: The effect of fiscal support on earnings management 
 
DA = β0 + β1 TFI + γ1MKT + γ2LEV + γ3SIZE + γ4EXP + γ5ROA + 
 γ6∆ROA + (year fixed effects) + (region fixed effects) + ε 
 
 
Variable  Pred. sign  Dep. = DA 
Constant  ? 
 0.0312 
(5.07)*** 
TFI  - 
                    -0.0033 
                   (-3.05)*** 
MKT  + 
 0.0002 
(3.11)*** 
LEV  + 
 0.0058 
(4.27)*** 
SIZE  - 
 -0.0026 
(-5.38)*** 
EXP  - 
 -0.0052 
(-1.98)** 
ROA  + 
 0.0184 
(3.89)*** 
∆ROA  + 
 0.0271 
 (11.91)*** 
     
Adj. R2 (%)        6.58 
Observations    3290 
 
Notes: This table reports the regression results for the test of H1. DA is the abnormal accruals estimated using the 
industry-specific modified Jones model with IPOs and SEOs deleted in the cross-sectional estimation of normal accruals. 
TFI refers to the sum of subsidy rate (SI) and income tax savings rate (TAXSAV), where SI is the subsidy rate, and TAXSAV is 
the income tax savings rate ascribed to both preferential income tax rate and income tax refund. All the independent 
variables including TFI are defined in the Appendix. The year and region dummies are included in the regressions but are 
not reported for simplicity. The t-statistics in parentheses are based on clustered standard error adjusted for correlations 
within industry. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 5  
Test of the differential effects of preferential tax treatment and financial subsidy on 
earnings management 
 
DA = β0 + β1SI + β2TAXSAV + γ1MKT + γ2LEV + γ3SIZE + γ4EXP + γ5ROA + 
 γ6∆ROA + (year fixed effects) + (region fixed effects) + ε 
 
 
Variable  Pred. sign  Dep. = DA 
Constant  ? 
 0.0316 
(5.23)*** 
SI  - 
 -0.0026 
 (-2.65)*** 
TAXSAV  - 
 -0.0055 
 (-3.22)*** 
MKT  + 
 0.0002 
 (3.38)*** 
LEV  + 
 0.0056 
 (4.27)*** 
SIZE  - 
 -0.0026 
  (-5.45)*** 
EXP  - 
 -0.0053 
 (-1.99)** 
ROA  + 
 0.0190 
 (4.13)*** 
∆ROA  + 
 0.0271 
  (11.86)*** 
     
Adj. R2 (%)        6.61 
Observations    3290 
 
Notes: This table reports the regression results for the tests of the differential effects of preferential tax treatment and 
financial subsidy on earnings management. DA is the abnormal accruals estimated using the industry-specific modified 
Jones model with IPOs and SEOs deleted in the cross-sectional estimation of normal accruals. SI is the subsidy rate. 
TAXSAV is the income tax savings rate ascribed to both preferential income tax rate and income tax refund. All the 
independent variables including SI and TAXSAV are defined in the Appendix. The year and region dummies are included in 
the regressions but are not reported for simplicity. The t-statistics in parentheses are based on clustered standard error 
adjusted for correlations within industry. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent 
levels, respectively. 
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Table 6  
Test of H1: Segregation of IPO firms from SEO firms  
 
Variable  Pred. sign  SEO firms (Dep. = DA)  IPO firms (Dep. = DA) 
Constant      ? 
 0.0065 
(0.68) 
 
  0.0120 
 (1.28) 
 
0.0273 
   (3.65)*** 
 
0.0272 
  (3.81)*** 
TFI  - 
 
  
-0.0035         
(-3.21)*** 
   
-0.0033                     
(-3.02)*** 
SI  - 
 -0.0023 
   (-3.12)*** 
   
-0.0032 
   (-2.27)** 
  
TAXSAV  - 
 -0.0071 
   (-3.05)*** 
   
-0.0037 
  (-1.72)* 
  
MKT  + 
 0.0003 
  (2.25)** 
 
0.0003 
  (2.18)** 
 
0.0003 
   (3.12)*** 
 
0.0003 
   (3.10)*** 
LEV  + 
 0.0037 
   (2.87)*** 
 
0.0036 
   (2.88)*** 
 
0.0025 
(1.36) 
 
0.0026 
(1.39) 
SIZE  - 
 -0.0013 
 (-1.67)* 
 
-0.0013 
 (-1.69)* 
 
-0.0027 
   (-3.17)*** 
 
-0.0027 
   (-3.20)*** 
EXP  - 
 -0.0062 
   (-1.82)** 
 
-0.0065 
  (-1.81)* 
 
-0.0049 
 (-1.89)* 
 
-0.0049 
 (-1.86)* 
ROA  + 
 0.0074      
(0.82) 
 
0.0059 
(0.63) 
 
0.0217 
   (4.48)*** 
 
0.0216 
   (4.83)*** 
∆ROA  + 
 0.0301  
(5.45)*** 
 
0.0304  
   (5.36)*** 
 
0.0247 
   (7.51)*** 
 
0.0246 
   (7.65)*** 
DistanceROE  ? 
 0.0047  
(2.12)** 
 
0.0049  
  (2.16)** 
    
           
Adj. R2 (%)        6.25  6.18  7.85  7.91 
Observations    1741  1741  1549  1549 
 
Notes: This table presents regressions results for the tests of H1 for SEO firm-years and IPO firm-years, respectively. The 
dependent variable is the abnormal accruals estimated using the industry-specific modified Jones model with IPOs and SEOs 
deleted in the cross-sectional estimation of normal accruals. SI is the subsidy rate. TAXSAV is the income tax savings rate 
ascribed to both preferential income tax rate and income tax refund. TFI refers to the sum of subsidy rate (SI) and income tax 
savings rate (TAXSAV). All the independent variables, including SI, TAXSAV, and TFI are defined in the Appendix. The year 
and region dummies are included in the regressions but are not reported for simplicity. The t-statistics in parentheses are based 
on clustered standard error adjusted for correlations within industry. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, 
and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MS-14-11-605 Final Draft 
10/15/15 
 42                                                                                 
Table 7  
Test of H1: Control for endogeneity 
  
Variable  
1st Stage 
TFI 
 2nd Stage 
DA 
 1st Stage 
SI 
 2nd Stage 
DA 
 1st Stage 
TAXSAV 
 2nd Stage 
DA 
Constant  
0.2645 
(2.17)*** 
 
0.0307 
(6.75)*** 
 
0.0472 
(0.49) 
 
0.0294 
(6.90)*** 
 
0.2173 
(3.18)*** 
 
0.0340 
(5.60)*** 
TFI    
-0.0071 
(-3.38)*** 
        
SI        
-0.0099 
(-3.62)*** 
    
TAXSAV            
-0.0251 
(-2.68)*** 
MKT  
0.0037 
(2.80)*** 
 
0.0003 
(3.80)*** 
 
-0.0004 
(-0.34) 
 
0.0002 
(2.92)*** 
 
0.0041 
(4.28)***  
 
0.0003 
(5.32)*** 
LEV  
-0.0455 
(-1.31) 
 
0.0056 
(4.36)*** 
 
0.0210 
(0.61) 
 
0.0062 
(4.61)*** 
 
-0.0664 
(-4.64)*** 
 
0.0043 
(3.04)*** 
SIZE  
-0.0096 
(-1.07) 
 
-0.0026 
(-5.58)*** 
 
-0.0019 
(-0.28) 
 
-0.0026 
(-5.56)*** 
 
-0.0077 
(-1.28) 
 
-0.0028 
(-5.21)*** 
EXP  
-0.0033 
(-0.12) 
 
-0.0054 
(-2.26)** 
 
0.0143 
(0.84) 
 
-0.0053 
(-2.10)** 
 
-0.0176 
(-0.87) 
 
-0.0058 
(-2.66)*** 
ROA  
4.5747 
(8.48)*** 
 
0.0195 
(4.41)*** 
 
3.0818 
(9.19)*** 
 
0.0175 
(4.02)*** 
 
1.4929 
(5.88)***  
 
0.0248 
(5.11)*** 
∆ROA  
0.0199 
(0.19) 
 
0.0278 
(11.88)*** 
 
0.0074 
(0.10) 
 
0.0278 
(11.92)*** 
 
0.0125 
(0.18)  
 
0.0280 
(11.04)*** 
INDSUBSI  
-5.8220 
(-8.42)*** 
   
-4.1907 
(-9.07)*** 
   
-1.6313 
(-5.26)*** 
  
GDP  
-0.0936 
(-0.17) 
   
0.0702 
(0.21) 
   
-0.1638 
(-0.47) 
  
             
Test of over-identifying restrictions          
Basmann 2 
(p-value) 
 
       1.0125 
(0.314) 
 
        0.9272 
   (0.336) 
 
         1.1756  
(0.278) 
       
Partial F-statistic  for instruments (p-value)     
  
91.57 
(<0.001)*** 
 
52.61 
(<0.001)*** 
 
25.71 
(<0.001)*** 
         
Adj. R2 (%)  30.22  7.46  18.72  6.35  23.39  4.37 
Observations  3290  3290  3290  3290  3290  3290 
 
Notes: This table presents the results for the two-stage least squares regression with INDSUBSI and GDP used as the 
instruments. TFI, SI, and TAXSAV are instrumented respectively as the dependent variables in the first-stage regressions. The 
dependent variable in the second-stage regression is the abnormal accruals estimated using the industry-specific modified 
Jones model with IPOs and SEOs deleted in the cross-sectional estimation of normal accruals. All the independent variables 
are defined in the Appendix. The year and region dummies are included in the regressions but are not reported for brevity. The 
t/z-statistics in parentheses are based on clustered standard error adjusted for correlations within industry. ***, **, * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 8  
Firm-fixed effect regression of fiscal support on earnings management 
 
Variable  Pred. sign  Dep. = DA 
TFI  - 
 
  
-0.0023 
(-2.42)** 
SI  - 
 -0.0030 
 (-5.58)*** 
  
TAXSAV  - 
 0.0013 
(0.46) 
  
MKT  + 
 0.0002 
(2.35)** 
 
0.0002 
(2.43)** 
LEV  + 
 0.0063 
(2.11)** 
 
0.0060 
(2.20)** 
SIZE  - 
 0.0039 
(1.86)** 
 
0.036 
(1.74)** 
EXP  - 
 -0.0051 
(-1.63) 
 
-0.0050 
(-1.58) 
ROA  + 
 0.0022 
(0.39) 
 
0.0036 
(0.64) 
∆ROA  + 
 0.0173 
(2.98)*** 
 
0.0176 
(3.09)*** 
       
Within-R2 (%)        3.87  3.37 
Observations    3290  3290 
 
Notes: This table reports the results for the firm-fixed effect regression of fiscal support on earnings management. DA is the 
abnormal accruals estimated using the industry-specific modified Jones model with IPOs and SEOs deleted in the cross- 
sectional estimates of normal accruals. SI is the subsidy rate. TAXSAV is the income tax savings rate ascribed to both 
preferential income tax rate and income tax refund. TFI refers to the sum of subsidy rate (SI) and income tax savings rate 
(TAXSAV). All the independent variables, including SI, TAXSAV, and TFI are defined in the Appendix. The year dummies are 
included in the regressions but are not reported for simplicity. The region dummies and the constant term are automatically 
differenced-out by the firm-fixed effect estimates. The t-statistics in parentheses are based on clustered standard error 
adjusted for correlations within industry. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent 
levels, respectively. 
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Appendix 
Summary of Variable Definitions 
 
Variable Definition 
DA Abnormal accruals for a firm for a fiscal year, which is estimated using industry- 
specific modified Jones model with IPOs and SEOs deleted in the cross-sectional 
estimation of normal accruals. 
SI Subsidy income divided by net income for a firm over a fiscal year. 
TAXSAV (33%* pre-tax income - income tax expense + tax refund) / net income for a firm over 
a fiscal year. 
TFI Sum of subsidy rate (SI) and income tax savings rate (TAXSAV) for a firm over a fiscal 
year. 
MKT Market value of common equity divided by book value of common equity for a firm at 
a fiscal year. 
LEV The sum of short- and long-term debt divided by total assets for a firm at a fiscal year. 
SIZE The natural logarithm of total assets for a firm at a fiscal year. 
EXP The ratio of fixed assets to total assets for a firm at a fiscal year. 
ROA Operating return on assets for a firm over a fiscal year. 
∆ROA The absolute value of change in operating return on assets for a firm over a fiscal year. 
DistanceROE The absolute difference between pre-subsidy ROE and regulatory ROE threshold for a 
firm over a fiscal year.  
INDSUBSI Industry median of pre-subsidy return on assets within a region for a fiscal year, 
deflated by total assets for a firm at the fiscal year. 
GDP Annual territorial GDP for the province in which a firm is headquartered, divided by 
annual national GDP. 
 
